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Why a Competition Law & Policy? 
Even though the field of competition law and policy is evolving rapidly 
and includes many different viewpoints on specific issues, it is being 
increasingly recognised that effective competition policy and law is 
important in shaping business culture. To understand the signfficance of 
competition policy for a developing economy, it is very important to know 
what do we actually mean by the term competition policy. 
Governmental measures that directly affect the behaviour of enterprises 
and the structure of industry constitutes competition policy. It covers a 
whole raft of executive policies and even approaches, whereas the law is 
a piece of legislative enactment to regulate the marketplace, which can 
be enforced in a court of law. 
Competition policy is an instrument to achieve efficient allocation of 
resources, technical progress, consumer welfare and to regulate 
concentration of economic power detriment to competition. It has different 
objectives in different countries but some major themes stand out. In 
most of the countries, it aims at promoting competition by discouraging 
anti-competitive behaviour. Freedom of trade, freedom of choice, access 
to markets, and achievement of economic efficiency to maximise consumer 
welfare are the other commonly expressed objectives of competition policy. 
The role of competition policy has also expanded in the last two decades 
to include curbing the adverse effects of government intervention in the 
marketplace. 
While opportunities for anti-competitive behaviour may be limited in 
many sectors most of the time by fierce competition between firms, 
market conditions are constantly changing. It cannot be guaranteed that 
a particular market will remain very competitive and hence less 
vulnerable to anti-competitive practices in the long term. By being 
comprehensive, competition policy provides a ready-made, consistent 
framework for dealing with anti-competitive behaviour in any sector of 
the economy. 
Introduction of a comprehensive competition policy can lead to significant 
advantages to business as well as consumers. For business, such a policy 
means fairness as it acts against anti-competitive practices that can 
drive efficient and well-run companies out of business. It ensures 
consistency because it is applied by a single authority working to a single 
set of published rules and a reduction in regulation since it is proactive, 
efficient and effective which avoids the need to commit manpower and 
time to devising new rules when new products or markets emerge. 
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For consumers, an effective competition policy & law leads to lower 
prices and improved services. An improvement in the coverage of 
competition law and a reduction in the time taken to remove barriers to 
competition mean a lot for the consumer. 
Without a domestic competition law & policy, it may be difficult to 
control international anticompetitive practices like cartels etc, which 
restrict trade and adversely affect economic development. Developing 
countries may be hit doubly by the international cartels: on one hand, 
they may pay more for certain inputs than they would if the international 
market was competitive and on the other hand, their efforts to build a 
competitive industrial sector may be stifled (see pg-15). 
However, it becomes very important to consider certain issues while 
drafting a competition policy because the high probability of even a 
desirable competition law & policy being implemented ineffectively by 
the competition agency due to various factors such as: 
Lack of political will; 
Lack of expertise; 
Inefficiency, and 
Resource constraints. 
The pre-drafting process should focus first on the key problems in the 
economy. The most important bottlenecks that create impediments for 
the growth in domestic and export markets should be identified. A 
realistic assessment of the availability of financial and human resources 
should guide the purview of the law and the nature of the enforcement 
policies. 
Institutions and their independence, separation of functions, adequate 
staffing and resource availability, and transparency are crucial for 
adequate competition law enforcement in any country. An agency that 
has little money and few people but an ambitious set of responsibilities 
should be careful in identifying its initial priorities. It is also significant 
to develop cooperative links with other agencies at the regional and the 
global level. Competition laws should be allowed to evolve and change 
to suit changing economic circumstances, while preserving the core 
objectives of competition policy. 
Developing countries should take positive action and build their internal 
capacity in the area of competition policy, fostering the adoption of best 
practices, making full use of the expertise accumulated by established 
competition agencies and taking advantage of technical assistance, 
advisory and training services provided by multilateral institutions. A 
multilateral framework for cooperation on competition issues would better 
serve the interests of developing countries than the absence of such an 
agreement. 
Jaipur Pradeep S Mehta 
March 2002 Secretary General 
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The value of competition policy (CP) 
and competition law (CL) is well 
understood in some countries, 
particularly in the US, where anti- 
trust laws have long been recognised 
as a force for dynamism in the 
economy and the sharing of benefits 
between firms and consumers. 
However, their value is not well 
understood by policy-makers, 
producers or consumers in most 
developing countries. 
CP is regarded with suspicion, as just 
another tool for transnational 
companies (TNCs). 
Consumers in developing countries do 
not generally consider competition to 
be an issue of any relevance, yet it is 
consumers who have the most to gain 
from CP through lower prices, more 
choice and higher quality in the 
goods and services that they can buy. 
Chapter-I 
Introduction 
The value of competition policy (CP) and competition law (CL) is 
well understood in some countries, particularly in the US, where 
anti-trust laws have long been recognised as a force for dynamism 
in the economy and the sharing of benefits between firms and 
consumers. However, their value is not well understood by policy- 
makers, producers or consumers in most developing countries. In 
many of these countries, competition is an issue that has come to 
the fore only because of its inclusion in the agenda of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO). At the insistence of the European Union 
(EU), it was included in the Doha Ministerial Declaration, November 
2001, and the member-states committed to begin negotiation on 
competition after the next Ministerial meeting in two years' time. 
General Perceptions 
CP is regarded with suspicion, as just another tool for transnational 
companies (TNCs), backed up by the governments of their rich 
home countries, to break into the markets of poor countries. CP is 
thought to benefit TNCs, which have inherent advantages because 
of their scale and scope, over domestic firms, which will be wiped 
out in the heat of international competition. 
Consumer as a Beneficiary 
Consumers in developing countries do not generally consider 
competition to be an issue of any relevance, yet it is consumers 
who have the most to gain from CP through lower prices, more 
choice and higher quality in the goods and services that they can 
buy. This negative perception has held back an open and informed 
debate on the benefits of competition policy and law at the national 
level as well as at the international level. 
However, a well-implemented competition policy may raise efficiency 
in the economy, spurring local firms to greater efficiency and 
ensuring that the benefits of economic growth in the economy are 
shared with people. A competition policy, rather than a policy of 
liberalisation, is a policy to balance the risks and constrain the 
negative effects of liberalisation, while providing for a predictable 
business environment. 
4)44 gi CUTS Challenges in Implementing a Competition Policy and Law 1 
The negative perception can be 
changed through the exchange of 
information and experience between 
developing countries, as well as from 
developed to developing countries. 
A short survey on participants' 
perceptions on CP was conducted 
during a symposium held in Geneva 
on "Competition Policy and 
Consumer Interest in the Global 
Economy" on 12-13 October 2001. 
The seminar discussions took up 
numerous case studies to reinforce the 
arguments that were being made. 
Information Sharing 
The negative perception can be changed through the exchange of 
information and experience between developing countries, as well 
as from developed to developing countries. CUTS assists this 
information-sharing process by organising events and publishing 
materials to raise awareness and break down biases on this central 
consumer issue in developing countries. (See Annexure-I for a list 
of CUTS publications on competition policy and law) 
About the Symposium 
A short survey on participants' perceptions on CP was conducted 
during a symposium held in Geneva on "Competition Policy and 
Consumer Interest in the Global Economy" on 12-13 October 2001. 
The one-and-a-half-day event was organised by CUTS and supported 
by the International Development Research Centre (IlDRC), Canada. 
The symposium was addressed by international experts and 
practitiontrs representing different stakeholder groups: consumer 
organisations, NG0s, media, academia, policy-makers etc., having 
diverse views regarding CP. An audience of 60 people from 30 
countries1 from all over the world, including representatives 
of Geneva trade missions, UNCTAD, WTO, European Commission 
etc., participated in the symposium. 
Survey Results of the Symposium 
The survey results showed: 
96% of the respondents were convinced that competition policy 
and law at the national level are important for consumer welfare, 
80% of the respondents said that the seminar had had an 
impact on their views, while 
25% of the respondents saying that their views had changed 
completely on this question as a result of the discussions at the 
seminar. 
All the respondents except one were of the view that events of 
this nature were valuable, which demonstrates how effective an 
open discussion can be in overturning preconceptions. (See 
Annexure-II for the complete survey results) 
Discussions at the Symposium 
The seminar discussions took up numerous case studies to reinforce 
the arguments that were being made. The case studies make it 
easier for those who are not familiar with the complexities of 
competition law and policy to understand how laws operate in real 
1 Argentina; Bangladesh; Bolivia; Brazil; Canada; Chad; Egypt; Fiji; Ghana; Hong Kong, India; Indonesia; Kenya; Malawi; 
Malaysia; Nepal; Pakistan; Panama; Poland; Senegal; Singapore; South Africa; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; Turkey; United 
Kingdom; West Indies and Zambia 
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In developing countries, some of the 
nwst striking examples are in 
services. 
This report has been prepared for 
easier and better understanding of 
the event, which took place, and its 
outcome in particular. 
life. Even in countries where consumer awareness is not very 
high, consumers are certainly sensitive to the price and the quality 
of the products that they purchase, and when consumers can see 
how the operation of a cartel raises the prices they have to pay, 
the relevance of competition policy can be easily demonstrated. 
In developing countries, some of the most striking examples are in 
services. In Malaysia, the privatisation of the road network 
amounted to a transfer of the edsting government monopoly to a 
monopoly in the private sector. Toll prices shot up and badly needed 
investment in the road network did not take place. This led to 
public protest and, eventually, the sector was re-nationalised. 
Consumer representatives felt that an active CA would be 
particularly valuable in advocating better privatisation. 
In Peru, consumers are aware of and supportive of the competition 
regime after a series of cartel cases in domestic consumer product 
industries. These included flour and chicken, which allowed the 
CA to demonstrate the direct impact that anti-competitive behaviour 
has on consumers through higher prices. These kinds of cases 
show how competition policy serves to benefit the consumers of 
developing countries. 
Rapporteur of the symposium: Phil Evans of Consumers Association, 
UK, has produced an analytical report covering the substantial 
points of the discussions that took place. A detailed report of the 
proceedings is also available on the website, http://cuts.org/comp- 
event-geneva.htm. 
This report has been prepared as a short paper for easier and 
better understanding of the event, which took place, and its outcome 
in particular. It has been laid out through chapters in an easy 
format. We hope that this publication will assist people in 
understanding the several dimensions of competition law and policy, 
as was debated at the symposium. Comments and clarifications 
are welcome, and can be sent to cuts@cuts.org. 
CUTS staff members: Olivia Jensen, Nupur Mehta, Nitya Nanda 
and Anjali Bansal have produced this report. 
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Many countries do not have a 
competition law (CL). There are two 
possible reasons for this. The first 
one is that there is a lack of 
awarencss about CL in the country or 
a lack of capacity to design and 
enact the law. The second one is that 
it is either believed not to be 
necessary or there is active 
opposition to it 
Open trade policy means that in most 
tradable sectors, domestic firms are 
forced to compete with imports, 
forcing them to stay competitive. 
However, many products in the 
economy are not traded, particularly 
services, and, hence, there is no 
competition from imports. 
Chapter-II 
Why Should Countries Introduce 
National Competition Law? 
Many countries do not have a competition law (CL). There are two 
possible reasons for this. The first one is that there is a lack of 
awareness about CL in the country or a lack of capacity to design 
and enact the law. The second one is that it is either believed not 
to be necessary or there is active opposition to it. Such opposition 
may come from policy-makers, but is more likely to come from 
domestic businesses. 
The first problem can be tackled through trainings and awareness 
generation. While, the second set of reasons, the belief that CL is 
mmecessary or positively harmful, need to be considered seriously 
before they can be put to rest. 
Arguments against implementation of CL 
The country has open trade policy 
Open trade policy means that in most tradable sectors, domestic 
firms are forced to compete with imports, forcing them to stay 
competitive. However, many products in the economy are not traded, 
particularly services, and, hence, there is no competition from 
imports. The case of Hong Kong demonstrates the kinds of 
competition problems that a very open economy can face. 
As Ron Cameron of Hong Kong's consumer association, argues, an 
open economy is not adequate to ensure competition and a fair 
distribution of gains between consumers and producers because 
even in a very open economy like Hong Kong's, there are large 
sectors which are not traded or where government policy effectively 
supports anti-competitive practices. However, the Hong Kong 
Consumer Council is represented on the Hong Kong Government's 
Advisory Group on Competition Policy and have been able to raise 
issues of concern. They have also been able to initiate some changes, 
but their efforts would be greatly strengthened by the introduction 
of a CL. 
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It is sometimes argued that countries 
can create a competition culture in 
the economy without having a 
competition law. However, there are 
good reasons for having a competition 
law to provide legal backing to any 
existing competition policy. 
It is sometimes argued that small 
countries do not need to have a 
competition policy, especially if they 
have no industrial base. 
The country has an effective competition policy without 
having competition law 
CL is only one element of CP. Competition policy in many countries 
is not a unified policy. It is made up of elements of sectoral policies, 
industrial policy, policies governing the roles of the public and 
private sectors in the economy, intellectual property law and policy, 
trade policy and consumer protection law and policy, etc. It is 
sometimes argued that countries can create a competition culture 
in the economy without having a competition law. 
However, there are good reasons for having a competition law to 
provide legal backing to any existing competition policy. A law 
provides for consistency and transparency and can institutionalise 
many good practices to ensure that they are sustained, even in 
different economic circumstances or under a less supportive political 
regime. Importantly, it provides a point of reference and redress 
for consumers, giving a 'bite' to consumer policy. 
This debate on the need for CL has been a point of contention. In 
Malaysia, for example, liberalised trade and other pro-market 
policies have ensured relatively high levels of competition in most 
sectors of the economy. However, one area in which consumers 
have suffered as a result of the absence of such a policy has been 
the badly designed and implemented privatisation programme, 
particularly in key utility sectors. In several cases, a government 
monopoly was transferred intact to the private sector to become a 
private monopoly. Consumers suffered from dramatic price rises 
and drop in the quality of services that occurred in several sectors. 
A CA, supported by an active consumer movement, could have 
played a vital advocacy role in structuring the newly privatised 
industries to create and sustain effective competition and could 
have provided an avenue for the redressal of aggrieved consumers. 
In his presentation, Ramdass Tikamdass of FOMCA, the 
Malaysian consumer federation, emphasised the essential role 
that the CA can and should play in advising governments in 
developing countries as they commercialise their utility sectors. 
The country is very small and does not have an indigenous 
industrial base 
It is sometimes argued that small countries do not need to have 
a competition policy, especially if they have no industrial base. 
Ratnakar Adhikari of ProPublic, Kathmandu, Nepal pointed out, 
with reference to the case of Nepal, that while small countries 
could rely, to some extent, on the institutional mechanisms of 
their large trading partners to tackle competition concerns involving 
foreign companies, national competition policy would still be useful 
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Developing countries, especially small 
economies and LDCs, may not have 
sufficient financial and human 
resources to enact CL and man an 
agency to oversee its implenwntation, 
to deal with anti-competitive practices in retailing and other non- 
traded service sectors. 
A case in Bhutan (population: 100,000) is an interesting example 
in this context. Hindustan Lever Ltd. (HLL) was operating in 
Bhutan through just one wholesaler: The Tashi Group of Companies. 
To regulate the monopoly in distribution, the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry (MTI) insisted that HLL appoint a parallel distributor. 
But, HLL's response was evasive, on the grounds that they can't 
find another firm, which has adequate experience and capital. 
Finally, the MTI suggested Food Corporation of Bhutan (FCB), a 
government company, which had both capital and a wide distribution 
network. Yet when HLL did not respond, MTI threatened that it 
would cancel Tashi's license to operate as HLL's distributor. The 
threat worked and HLL soon appointed FCB as its second 
wholesaler. In turn, it was HLL which gained hugely. FCB soon 
multiplied HLL's business in Bhutan three fold. 
Developing countries lack sufficient resources 
Developing countries, especially small economies and LDCs, may 
not have sufficient financial and human resources to enact CL and 
man an agency to oversee its implementation. Resource constraints 
may pose problems for small countries when trying to set up their 
own competition and consumer protection regimes and one solution 
could be for small countries to consider a regional approach to 
institution-building. Another possibility would be to combine the 
CA with the consumer protection and intellectual property 
regulatory agencies, as in Peru and other South American countries. 
The special needs of small countries may be reflected in the scope 
or provisions of the law, for example, in whether or not the law 
needs to contain merger control provisions. Merger control is very 
costly in terms of time and skills for a CA and may not be worthwhile 
in a small country. However, small countries are also more 
vulnerable to the acquisition of domestic firms by large foreign 
firms, which can radically reduce competition in the relevant market 
and have a major impact on domestic consumer welfare. Thus, 
some provision for takeovers may be useful. 
In all cases, CP and CL should be realistic: many small countries 
have laws that look excellent on paper, but are either not 
appropriate to the specific needs of that economy or require a level 
of capacity that the country simply does not have. 
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If anything, competition law provides 
some protection to domestic firms 
from foreign firms that use anti- 
competitive practices to capture the 
national market. 
A sophisticated CL looks at 
competition in the relevant market 
when considering a merger. If a firm 
is competing primarily with foreign 
firms for an international market, 
then this will be taken into account 
and the nterger will be allowed to go 
&wall 
Arguments: Why CL is Harmful? 
Allows foreign firms to come in and take over domestic 
firm 
The effect of foreign entry into the market depends on the 
capabilities of domestic firms. If anything, competition law provides 
some protection to domestic firms from foreign firms that use anti- 
competitive practices to capture the national market. 
In some cases, TNCs are able to supply products at lower prices 
than domestic firms because of economies of scale, better 
management and higher levels of efficiency in the production 
process. If this is the case, then consumers benefit unambiguously 
from the entry of foreign firms. However, in some cases, firms 
enter the market with artificially low prices so that they can 
capture market share from domestic firms, drive these firms out 
of business and raise prices after having achieved a monopolistic 
position. This is a case of predatory pricing, a strategy that is also 
often used by incumbent monopolists to maintain their position. 
Predatory pricing is a very difficult issue to judge, but CL at least 
provides an avenue for domestic firms to protect themselves from 
unfair competition. 
There is also a risk that trade liberalisation may lead to defensive 
anti-competitive actions by domestic firms, as has been the case in 
some industries in South Africa. Astrid Ludin of the South 
African Competition Commission points out several examples of 
this in South Africa, including the sugar industry and the retail 
banking sector which the CA has been able to challenge. In general, 
the entry of efficient foreign firms into the market should give a 
boost to competitiveness in domestic firms, with benefits to the 
economy as a whole. 
Prevents domestic firms growing into world-class 
companies 
From a different angle, an objection that is often made to CL in 
developing countries is that a tough regime for the control of mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As) will stifle the growth of potentially world- 
class companies that have not yet grown to a sufficient size to 
compete with TNCs in global markets. There is no reason for this 
to be the case. A sophisticated CL looks at competition in the 
relevant market when considering a merger. If a firm is competing 
primarily with foreign firms for an international market, then this 
will be taken into account and the merger will be allowed to go 
ahead. 
In 2001, for example, the New Zealand Competition Authority 
permitted a merger between the country's two largest dairy 
companies, allowing them to form a domestic monopoly on the 
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grounds that the firms were in strong competition with foreign 
firms and the consolidation was necessary to maintain 
competitiveness. This objection can be tackled by carefully drafting, 
firstly, the criteria for consideration of the merger by the CA and, 
secondly, the criteria against which the merger is judged. 
In many countries, small, medium and micro-enterprises are 
thought to play a vital role in economic development and there is 
concern that such firms are not capable of competing in global 
markets without extra support from the government. Some forms 
of support, such as preferential financing and support for 
collaborative research and development may conflict with CL. 
However, the government can provide specific exemptions for these 
firms in the national law where this fits in with the national 
development strategy. 
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Every country needs to tailor CL to 
its own specific set of needs and 
conditions. The most important factor 
is that the law should be realistic. 
It may be practical to consider cases 
only when anti-competitive practices 
are brought to the attention of the 
CA, whether these are in broad or 
narrow geographical markets. 
There is scope for exceptions and 
exemptions in CL and countries 
should make careful use of these. 
However, exemptions should be 
included with caution. 
Chapter-III 
What Form Should National 
Competition Law Take? 
On the basis of the available evidence, including the experiences 
of developing countries that have adopted a competition law, it is 
strongly recommended that other countries draft and implement 
their own competition law. 
Different model for different countries 
This is not to suggest that 'one size fits all' and that countries 
should adopt either the model used by a neighbour or one of the 
models drafted by an international body such as those formulated 
by the UNCTAD and the OECD. On the contrary, every country 
needs to tailor CL to its own specific set of needs and conditions. 
The most important factor is that the law should be realistic. 
There is no point in a developing country enacting a state-of-the- 
art CL with provisions for screening a high proportion of M&As 
and with a large and active CA to administer it. 
How could resource constraints be managed? 
In most developing countries, the resources, both financial and 
human, are limited and may not be available to run such an 
Agency. For such countries, it may be practical to consider cases 
only when anti-competitive practices are brought to the attention 
of the CA, whether these are in broad or narrow geographical 
markets. Introducing a law that carmot be properly implemented 
is not just futile but may be counter-productive. If the CA is seen 
not to be fulfilling its mandate, then people may lose faith in the 
effectiveness of CL as a whole. 
How should the provisions look like? 
Provisions should be appropriate as well as realistic. There is 
scope for exceptions and exemptions in CL and countries should 
make careful use of these. If, for example, the national development 
strategy of a country includes policies to promote small and medium- 
sized enterprises, disadvantaged regions or groups, then these 
regions could be exempted from some of the provisions of CL. 
However, exemptions should be included with caution. At the stage 
when the legislation is being drafted and debated, many interest 
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Public sector enterprises (PSEs) are 
exempted from the CL in some 
countries under the paradigm that 
'the king can do no wrong'. 
The specification of consunwr 
interests will give the law a different 
emphasis 
The role of consumer in CL should 
also include the right of consumer 
organisations to bring complaints to 
the CA and to be included in the 
consultative process for policy 
questions, especially in the case of 
developing countries, which suffer 
from the problem of resource 
constraints. 
groups can be expected to lobby for their exclusion from the law. 
It is more than likely that this is not based on any sound arguments 
of economic efficiency or consumer welfare, but is simply to prolong 
the protection of inefficient businesses from competition. 
It may also be the case that a country at an early stage of 
development carmot be sure what kind of exceptions it might want 
to have in the future. A broad clause allowing exceptions to be 
made "in the public interest" will allow flexibility, but runs the 
risk of being exploited by special interests. 
Application of CL to all the sectors 
Public sector enterprises (PSEs) are exempted from the CL in 
some countries under the paradigm that the king can do no wrong'. 
Like in the case of India, the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act, 1969, did not include PSEs. However, in 1991, the 
Act was amended to make it applicable to the PSEs. 
In general, exemption of PSEs from CL runs counter to the aim 
of trying to create a competition culture within the country. Bringing 
the PSEs within the scope of the law would allow consumers to 
demand the same standards of efficiency and service from the 
public sector as they do from the private sector. 
Economic efficiency vs. Consumer welfare 
One of the key debates in CL is whether the primary aim of the 
legislation should be to promote economic efficiency or consumer 
welfare. While these two aims may often coincide, the specification 
of consumer interests will give the law a different emphasis. Specific 
mention of consumer welfare may help to ensure that consumers 
and their representative groups have an active role in the 
implementation of the law and direct the attention of the authority 
to cases of consumer interest as well as to cases brought by 
competing businesses. 
Important role of consumer organisations 
On the basis of CUTS research and the conclusions of the Geneva 
seminar, there was a general recommendation that consumer 
welfare should be explicitly mentioned in the legislation. The role 
of consumer in CL should also include the right of consumer 
organisations to bring complaints to the CA and to be included in 
the consultative process for policy questions, especially in the case 
of developing countries, which suffer from the problem of resource 
constraints. This would not only reduce the burden on the state 
but would also facilitate control and check on the anti-competitive 
practices. 
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The law should allow specifically for 
co-operation and information sharing 
with other competition authorities. 
Putting the consumer at the heart of the legislation makes it more 
likely that the benefits of CL will be shared widely. 
International dimension and cooperation 
The international dimension of competition challenges is becoming 
more prominent. As trade and investment regimes are liberalised 
in most developing countries, the inflow of foreign products and 
companies creates new challenges. The law should take account of 
this and, in particular, should allow specifically for co-operation 
and information sharing with other competition authorities. It is 
possible that the practice of co-operation may be built up anyway, 
but it will be given a boost by inclusion in the legislation itself. 
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The effectiveness of the CL will 
depend on the extent to which it is 
co-ordinated with other policies and, 
consequently, the most direct overlap 
will be with sectoral regulators 
governing hey utility sectors, which 
usually have been creating and 
promoting competition in the sector 
as part of their mandate. 
Experierwe from many countries shows 
that the effectiveness of a CA 
fluctuates with the quality of the 
Authority's leadership. 
Chapter-IV 
How to Make the 
Competition Law Effective 
There is no guarantee that good legislation will meet its aims. 
Creating a competition culture depends on effective implementation 
and a supportive policy environment. There are a number of factors 
that contribute to but have the potential to undermine a good CL. 
Relation with other policies 
As mentioned above, CL is just one element of competition policy. 
The effectiveness of the CL will depend on the extent to which it 
is co-ordinated with other policies and, consequently, the most 
direct overlap will be with sectoral regulators governing key utility 
sectors, which usually have been creating and promoting 
competition in the sector as part of their mandate. The boundaries 
and roles of the sectoral regulators and the CA are difficult to 
define and in many countries the issues remain unresolved. Ideally, 
the sectoral regulators would concentrate on the structure of the 
sector, trying to create a competitive market so that the regulator's 
day-to-day role in setting prices would diminish over time. 
The role of the CA would be to deal with cases of abuse of dominance 
when they arise. However, it is likely that sectoral regulators will 
continue to play a hands-on role for the foreseeable future. To 
prevent potential conflict and confusion, the CL and the sectoral 
laws should specify clearly the circumstances under which the CA 
could investigate the behaviour of companies in the regulated sector. 
The legislation should also define a consultative role for the CA in 
the development of sectoral policies. 
Good leadership 
Experience from many countries shows that the effectiveness of a 
CA fluctuates with the quality of the Authority's leadership. This 
is true in the US, where the Federal Trade Commission was 
transformed into an active trust-busting body only in the 1970s 
with a change in leadership and a boost in political support rather 
than a change in the law. It is extremely helpful if the leader of 
a new CA has personal prestige, as this will give the institution 
itself higher standing in the political arena and also in the eyes of 
the public. It is also helpful if the leader has good political contacts 
that can assist him in taking up more controversial cases. 
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High level political backing will be 
necessary to ensure that there is no 
political interference in the work of 
the CA and its decisions are carried 
out 
An active consumer movenwnt makes 
a significant difference to the 
effectiveness of CL. 
Political support 
As an extension of the point above, political support is crucial to 
the success of CL. This will enable the passage of legislation and 
probably provide more independence and resources for the Authority 
that will implement the policy. Wide publicity about the CA and 
its support from key politicians will make it more difficult for the 
politicians to backtrack on their commitment under pressure from 
special interest groups. Political backing will raise the profile of 
competition issues and should create awareness in the public of 
the issues involved through the media. 
In the course of its work, the CA will have to take on entrenched 
domestic interest groups. Many of these groups will have benefited 
from protection from competition in the past from domestic or 
foreign sources and continue to be very influential in the political 
system. High level political backing will be necessary to ensure 
that there is no political interference in the work of the CA and 
its decisions are carried out. 
An active consumer movement 
A resounding conclusion from the Symposium and from CUTS' in- 
depth research on CP in seven developing countries (the "7-Up 
Projece)2 is that an active consumer movement makes a significant 
difference to the effectiveness of CL. Empowered consumers and 
representative organisations will bring anti-competitive practices, 
including abuse of dominance and collusion, to the attention of the 
CA. They will also act as a positive pressure to counteract the 
opposition of inefficient businesses to the successful implementation 
of the CL. 
Many consumers are not aware of the relevance of competition 
policy. Therefore, consumer organisations have an important role 
in demonstrating the importance of CP by connecting the policy 
with people's everyday experiences and products with which they 
are familiar. Consumer organisations, therefore, have a very 
important role to play in raising awareness and stimulating interest 
among consumers about what CP is for and how it can be used. 
They can also put pressure on the government to enact a Consumer 
Law, where one does not already exist. 
2 The CUTS Centre for International Trade, Economics & Environment (CITEE) is implementing a two-year research 
project entitled "The 7-U11) Project". This project involves a comparative study of the competition regimes of seven 
developing countries in the Commonwealth with the aim of strengthening their competition laws. This initiative is 
supported by the Department for International Development, UK. The countries covered under this project are: India, 
Kenya, Pakistan, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Zambia. For more details please visit http://www.cuts.org/7-up 
project.stm 
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The harmful effects of cartels are 
two-folth on the one hand, there are 
the visible results like higher prices 
and reduced supply; and on the other 
hand, with even more serious 
implication for economic development, 
cartels use predatory tactics to 
exclude developing country producers 
from their markets. 
Chapter-V 
What are the International 
Competition Challenges 
Very few people in developed and developing countries appreciate 
the international dimension of competition policy. However, 
international competition issues can have a great impact on national 
economic development. There are also direct results for consumers 
in terms of higher prices, poor standards and restrictions on the 
products that they have access to. The following section identifies 
some of competition policy's international dimensions. 
International cartels 
As Rob Anderson of the WTO points out, consumers in both 
developing and developed countries suffer great losses at the hands 
of international cartels. While international cartels, like the 
vitamins cartel, have been convicted and prevented from operating 
in the US and Europe, they are still operating in developing 
countries. The cartels have simply migrated towards those 
jurisdictions where they can get away without penalty. 
Consequently, developing countries are now suffering more than 
ever as a result of these conspiracies. 
The potential gains for developing countries have not been quantified 
but are likely to be huge. This is confirmed by the amount of 
money that corporations are willing to pay to settle legal cases 
relating to their operations and avoid conviction. According to an 
estimate by the World Bank studies3 on the international cartels, 
the value of "cartel-affected" imports to developing countries was 
US$81.1bn from just 16 cartels during 1990s. It is clear from the 
magnitude of these figures that cartels have adversely affected a 
siglificant portion of the trade, thereby affecting the trade balance 
and consumption of developing countries. 
The harmful effects of cartels are two-fold: on the one hand, there 
are the visible results like higher prices and reduced supply; and 
on the other hand, with even more serious implication for economic 
development, cartels use predatory tactics to exclude developing 
3 Background Paper for the World Bank's World Development Report 2001, "Private International Cartels and Their 
Effect on Developing Countries" by Margaret Levenstein and Valarie Suslow. 
14 Challenges in Implementing a Competition Policy and Law ct) -( CUTS 
This can result in unhealthy 
cotw.entration of the market and 
create a position of dominance for a 
firm, which may later be abused 
country producers from their markets. The harmful effects on 
development are exacerbated by the fact that many of these cartels 
exist in industrial input industries. 
CAs in developing countries do not have the resources to gather 
information on the effects of cartel operations in their markets, let 
alone the ability to gather enough evidence to convict a cartel. In 
this matter, the co-operation of developed countries' CAs is crucial. 
Both Australia and Canada, for example, have relied on 
information from the US to tackle the vitamins cartel. 
Cross-border M&As 
A rising proportion of foreign direct investment (FDI) comes through 
M&As of existing firms in the host country. This is particularly 
the case in developed countries, but is also the case in some 
developing countries. This can result in unhealthy concentration of 
the market and create a position of dominance for a firm, which 
may later be abused. 
When restrictions on FDI are lifted, it is impossible for a developing 
country to prevent the acquisition of a domestic competitor by a 
powerful multinational that is already importing to the market, if 
the country does not have a CL. The comparative size of the TNC 
and the national economy of a developing country mean that M&A 
activity can have a serious impact on the economy as a whole, in 
negative as well as positive ways. 
The box below demonstrates how active implementation of CL can 
be used by a developing country to prevent a TNC from attaining 
a position of dominance in the domestic market. 
The Acquisition of Chilanga Cement of Zambia by Lafarge 
Lafarge, the international cement giant, has an active global acquisition-strategy 
that is leading to increasing concentration of the industry at the global level, as well 
as in particular countries and regions. The cement industry world-wide is notorious 
for its anti-competitive tendencies and is becoming increasingly concentrated. Lafarge, 
like other cement companies, is trying to secure its hold on regional markets through 
this strategy. 
The acquisition of Chilanga further strengthened Lafarge's position in the regional 
market. The absence of an effective competition regime in other countries meant 
that only the Zambia Competition Commission (ZCC) considered the case. In order 
to prevent its anti-competitive effects, the ZCC imposed conditions on the merger, 
which the company met. This case demonstrates that an active CA with sufficient 
resources and a CL with provisions for severe punishments such as prison terms can 
successfully take on a multinational company to the benefit of the whole regional 
market. 
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The CA in each market can subject 
the transaction to it's own mergers- 
approval process and may impose 
conditions on the firms' subsidiaries 
operating in the country. 
The difficulty for developing 
countries lies in their lower levels of 
awareness and their lack of resources 
to conduct the extremely costly and 
demanding analysis that the merger 
approval process requires. 
Developing countries may also be affected by M&A activity that 
takes place outside their territory. The trend of mega-mergers 
between the US and European firms has generated much concern 
that competition will be stifled around the world. In some cases, 
subsidiaries of the merging firms may share most of a developing 
country's market, implying that the merger of the subsidiaries in 
that market would create a near monopoly. 
The CA in each market can subject the transaction to it's own 
mergers-approval process and may impose conditions on the firms' 
subsidiaries operating in the country. In a recent case, the 
Competition Commission of Zimbabwe authorised the merger of 
the local businesses of British American Tobacco (Zimbabwe) Limited 
and Rothmans of Pall Mall (Zimbabwe) Limited, after imposing 
certain terms and conditions. 
The imposition was based on the anticipated benefits of the merger, 
as promised by the merging parties, and was designed to alleviate 
the adverse effects of the merger. The merged company was 
required to consult the Commission every time it proposed a price 
increase; the merging parties should allow competitors to operate 
in related downstream industries and should give an undertaking 
that the product range, quality and services will not deteriorate. 
Let us take another example of Unilever Brooke Bond. After the 
merger of Lipton and Brooke Bond, Unilever took-over Brooke 
Bond-Lipton the world over. The Monopoly Control Authority of 
Pakistan allowed this merger on the condition that Unilever 
would take up tea plantations in Pakistan, which was not being 
done so far. Unilever agreed to do so and the merger was allowed. 
However, if the firms are only exporting their products, it will be 
impossible for the CA to impose conditions. The difficulty for 
developing countries lies in their lower levels of awareness and 
their lack of resources to conduct the extremely costly and 
demanding analysis that the merger approval process requires. 
Competition concerns are particularly strong in certain industries 
of great importance to some developing economies that are 
dominated by a small number of TNCs. 'These include the telecom 
sector and the tourism industry. 
While most developing countries are extremely keen to attract 
foreign direct investment in these sectors, CA must be vigilant in 
watching out for anti-competitive practices by foreign entrants at 
the national level. The CA will want t,o consider the TNC's potential 
for market dominance when considering its acquisition of a domestic 
firm. 
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7'he size and scope of TNCs makes it 
possible for them to engage in a 
variety of anti-competitive practices, 
to the detriment of developing 
econamies and to consunzer welfatv. 
Regional economic co-operation can 
lead to dumping, if a company 
operates as a monapoly in one 
country and is, therefore, able to 
export at artificially low prices. 
Anti-competitive practices by TNCs 
The size and scope of TNCs makes it possible for them to engage 
in a variety of anti-competitive practices, to the detriment of 
developing economies and to consumer welfare. These include tied- 
selling agreements and restrictions on the activities of subsidiaries 
(e.g. whether they are allowed to export, and where). 
Many of the restrictive practices relate to intellectual property 
(IP), in the form of technology, brands, etc., which is a 
multinational's key asset. For example, IP licensing agreements 
among competitors, such as patent pooling and cross licensing, can 
act as vehicles for the establishment of cartels. To tackle these, it 
may be useful for the national CL to contain particular provisions 
dealing exclusively with intellectual property. 
Dumping and anti-dumping actions 
Regional economic co-operation can lead to dumping, if a company 
operates as a monopoly in one country and is, therefore, able to 
export at artificially low prices. Looking at the experience of 
Argentina, Jorge Bogo, former President of the CA, pointed out 
that the rapid liberalisation of trade that took place with the creation 
of Mercosur drove greater co-operation and co-ordination on 
competition in the region. 
Countries were concerned about the operation of regional cartels 
and foreign goods being dumped onto their domestic markets. Anti- 
dumping is, of course, primarily a trade issue and dealt with by 
trade ministries or authorities rather than by the CA. However, 
conflicts may arise between the two as consumers benefit from 
lower prices that may harm domestic industries. Ideally, a regional 
competition policy would obviate the need for anti-dumping actions 
within a regional trading bloc. 
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In order to face these challen ges, 
developing countries require, in the 
first place, a national competition 
law. This would allow them to 
investigate anti-contpetitive behaviour 
by the TNCs operating in the 
domestic economy and to impose 
punitive or structurally corrective 
measures as necessary. 
Chapter-VI 
How to Deal with International 
Competition Challenges 
In order to face these challenges, developing countries require, in 
the first place, a national competition law. This would allow them 
to investigate anti-competitive behaviour by the TNCs operating in 
the domestic economy and to impose punitive or structurally 
corrective measures as necessary. 
If the law includes merger-approval procedures, then the national 
CA would also be able to assess the impact of a merger between 
two foreign firms or between a foreign firm and a domestic firm 
and to impose conditions on the merger as necessary (see pgs. 17- 
18), as the Zambia Competition Commission, Competition 
Commission of Zimbabwe and the Monopoly Control Authority of 
Pakistan did in the case of Lafarge, BAT-Rothmans and Unilever 
Brooke Bond respectively. 
In some cases, the existence of the law, especially if it has provisions 
for criminal sentences, can have a preventive effect and reduce 
the incidence of abuse by firms without the need for investigation 
or prosecution. 
However, developing-country CAs do not, in general, have the 
resources or the experience to tackle international competition 
challenges. Cartel cases are notoriously difficult to prove, even for 
the American and European authorities in dealing with companies 
based in their territories. Cartel cases will, therefore, be almost 
impossible for a developing country to handle, as it is not possible 
to set up microphones in the boardroom of an American company. 
In India, CUTS tried to do some preliminary investigations to 
find out whether the subsidiaries of the big pharma companies, 
like Rhone Poulenc, BASF, Hoffmann La Roche, etc., which have 
been involved in the international vitamin cartel, have also indulged 
in selling bulk-vitamins in India and the extent of overcharging 
thereof, if any. An effort was made to get an undertaking from the 
CEOs of these companies to the effect that they have not been 
involved in such activities. All companies, except Rhone Poulenc, 
responded. 
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A developing country could be 
allowed to make a special submission 
on the impact in their market to 
avoid the case being considered all 
over again in their jurisdiction, 
saving the company time and nwney. 
Developing country authorities can 
simply make a request to the CA of 
another country for information about 
a company or about how the authority 
went about conducting an 
investigation. 
Interestingly, Rhone Poulenc had escaped criminal punishment 
under an amnesty deal by supplying the US prosecutors with the 
evidence that cracked the cartel. Following that, CUTS asked the 
Director General (Investigation and Registration) of the Indian 
competition authority to launch investigations. However, no further 
investigation was done by them and the matter was dropped, without 
any substantial reasons. 
Developing countries need to explore several ways to gain access 
to the information that they need and build the internal capacity 
to deal effectively with international competition challenges. 
Ad hoc solutions 
One possibility is to submit evidence for cases that are being 
brought in other countries. The CL of a country only applies to 
company activities that affect the domestic market, which means 
that exports are excluded. However, a developing country could be 
allowed to make a special submission on the impact in their market 
to avoid the case being considered all over again in their jurisdiction, 
saving the company time and money. 
In the case of a cartel, the harm caused to the other country could 
be included in the calculation of fines and in the case of a merger, 
extra conditions could be imposed on the firms to ensure that 
competition was not restricted in the other market. This kind of 
involvement would necessarily be ad hoc and rely on the willingness 
of developed country courts/CA to accept evidence. This would vary 
from case to case. It would also rely on vigilance on the part of the 
developing country CA, which would have to keep a close track of 
the activities of other CAs to take part in the proceedings, and 
might require changes to legal doctrine or law in some countries. 
Informal co-operation 
This kind of co-operation does not rely on any agreement being 
signed by national governments and is carried out at the level of 
the CA. Developing country authorities can simply make a request 
to the CA of another country for information about a company or 
about how the authority went about conducting an investigation. 
The latter will be of great use to the developing counties in building 
up the capacity of their CAs. 
A drawback is that much of the information about companies is 
considered to be 'business sensitive' and is, thus, confidential. Other 
authorities will generally not be able to share this information, but 
an important exception is information about the activities of cartels 
and so this could be passed on. 
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A formal agreement strengthens the 
informal co-operation that already 
exists by raising the profile of co- 
operrition and providing an 
institutional fiximework 
Small countries may find that they 
can achieve ecorwmies of scale and 
minimise the incklence of anti- 
dumping actions through regional 
competition arrangements. 
Co-operation with other developing countries may also be very 
useful, as these countries are likely to have faced similar types of 
problems. Although they may have less experience with CL, their 
experience may be more relevant. 
Formal co-operation 
Once authorities have some experience of working together and 
are satisfied with each other's ability to keep information 
confidential, they may move to a higher level of co-operation, 
formalised in an agreement between the two governments. 
Competition agencies in the US, Canada, Australia, the EU and 
Japan are linked by a network of agreements on co-operation. 
Developing countries have, by and large, not been party to such 
agreements for two reasons. One, current agreements exist 
between agencies with comparable levels of experience and 
information and, two, the perception in many developed countries 
that the authorities in developing countries might have difficulty 
in keeping confidential the business information passed on to them. 
One of the few exceptions is the agreement between Brazil and 
the US. 
A formal agreement strengthens the informal co-operation that 
already exists by raising the profile of co-operation and providing 
an institutional framework. It may not, in itself, make any 
difference to the depth of contact and information sharing between 
the authorities. 
Regional approaches 
Small countries may find that they can achieve economies of scale 
and minimise the incidence of anti-dumping actions through 
regional competition arrangements. Caricom, the economic co- 
operation body of the Caribbean economies, is one example (See 
box). COMESA, the regional economic body for Eastern and Southern 
Africa is also working on developing a regional CP. In this case, 
the motivation has come from within the region itself from concerns 
that TNCs were dividing up the "regional pie" at the expense of 
COMESA consumers and producers and as a result of the entry of 
South African firms into other regional markets. 
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Caricom 
The region is currently trying to put in place an over-arching 
regional CA, as envisaged in the regional agreement. The 
driving logic behind this has been the need for an economic 
area to have a common competition regime and concerns 
arising from the entry of powerful TNCs into the region. 
Apart from Trinidad and Tobago, where the economy is oil- 
based, the Caribbean economies are focused on tourism, a 
sector in which there is a small number of dominant 
international players. This makes the Caribbean economies 
vulnerable to abuse of dominance by these companies, which 
a regional CA may deal with, whereas a national authority 
may not. 
In the Caribbean, as elsewhere, privatisation took place before 
an adequate competition regime had been put in place as a 
result of ignorance and external pressure. In the 
telecommunications sector, for example, TNCs have gained 
monopolies in some of the economies. A regional CA would 
be able to consider the impact of an acquisition on all the 
economies and would prevent powerful TNCs from playing 
the states off against each other to secure special privileges. 
Views on multilateral competition 
policy were quite divided, according 
to our survey of seminar participants. 
Chapter-VII 
What are the Pros and Cons of a 
Multilateral Competition Policy 
Given the limitations of the approaches mentioned above, there is 
a good case for drawing up a multilateral competition policy (MCP) 
to meet international competition challenges. There are also a 
number of drawbacks to an MCP, particularly in the context of the 
WTO. 
Views on multilateral competition policy were quite divided, 
according to our survey of seminar participants: 
Sixty percent of the respondents believed that some kind of 
MCP would benefit developing countries and their consumers, while 
20 percent thought otherwise. 
The rest 20 percent were undecided on the issue, reflecting the 
absence of in-depth research on its projected effects on developing 
countries. 
Just over a half (56 percent) of the respondents also said that 
they felt developing countries should support an MCP at the WTO, 
but there was a slightly higher proportion of negative responses to 
this question: 28 percent thought that developing countries should 
not support it, while the remaining 16 percent were undecided. 
Diverse views of the participants 
It may be noted, however, that quite a few of them were not 
opposed to MCP as such, but feel that the developing countries are 
not yet prepared to participate effectively in any negotiations at an 
international forum. Moreover, it was observed during the debate 
at the seminar that many of the participants from the developing 
countries do not have full confidence in the WTO system and also 
that whenever the issue of MCP comes up for discussion, they link 
it to the present discussion on the subject at the WTO. Thus, it 
may be said that a much higher proportion of the participants are 
probably in favour of an MCP, but the same is not properly reflected 
in the survey due to the prevailing circumstances. 
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Some developing countries object to 
an MCP because they perceive it as 
yet another tool for market access 
which will benefit multinationals at 
the expense of consumers and 
national economies. 
Again, about half of the audience said that their views on MCP 
had changed or has been reinforced as a result of the symposium. 
About a quarter of the audience said their views had changed, 
while another quarter said their previous view had been 
strengthened and the remainder said their convictions had 
remained the same. 
A notable aspect of this change has been that it has been one-sided 
throughout. Among those whose views did not change, about half 
(28 percent of the total audience) still feel that there is no need 
for an MCP, especially at the WTO. The remaining (24 percent 
of the total audience) were already in favour of an MCP. Those 
whose views were changed or strengthened are all in favour of an 
MCP, but not necessarily at the WTO framework. Moreover, those 
who are not sure about the benefits of an MCP now were mostly 
either opposed to an MCP before or not adequately exposed to the 
issue prior to the symposium. 
Is MCP needed? 
There are two questions that need to be answered in relation to 
an MCP. One, "is it needed?" and if it is then, two, "is WTO the 
best place for it to be located?" 
On the first point, some developing countries object to an MCP 
because they perceive it as yet another tool for market access 
which will benefit multinationals at the expense of consumers and 
national economies. They suspect that an MCP is the thin end of 
the wedge and that they will end up having to abandon development 
policies that support domestic businesses. 
There is some basis for these concerns, but they could be dealt 
with by careful drafting of the agreement to make sure that 
potentially harmful provisions were not included. Improved market 
access could also work in favour of developing countries in some 
sectors where developed-country markets are insulated from 
competition. 
Developing countries could benefit from provisions of an MCP 
including: 
Increased co-operation and information sharing between 
competition authorities; 
A formalised obligation by developed countries to provide 
technical assistance; and 
A commitment that developed countries would consider 
developing-country interests in the course of their investigations 
through positive and negative comity. 
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The agreement would also streamline the merger-approvals process. 
This would mainly be to the advantage of companies, but could 
lead to improved efficiency and ultimately to lower prices or 
innovative products for developing as well as developed economies. 
There is insufficient evidence available at this stage to be sure 
that the benefits would be greater than the costs of implementing 
an MCP. And, while it would seem that the negative effects would 
be outweighed by the positive, more research on those lines is 
crucial for an informed debate on the issue. 
The second point, whether to place an MCP in the WTO or not, 
is a subject of heated debate. Within the WTO, member-states are 
divided into three roughly equal groups: 
those favouring, led by the EU; 
those opposing, including India, Pakistan and others; and 
the undecided countries. 
Current proposal 
The current proposal is a statement of core principles on 
transparency, non-discrimination, procedural fairness and recognition 
of the ills of hard-core cartels. It would not require developing 
countries to introduce national competition legislation immediately, 
nor would it establish a supranational CA or use the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism to overturn decisions made by domestic 
authorities. The draft proposal made by the EU to the Working 
Group in 2001 also allows for Special and Differential Treatment 
to developing countries. However, it would put extra pressure on 
countries to introduce competition. 
Developing countries' apprehensions 
Developing countries are resisting these proposals for a number of 
reasons, mainly their scepticism and distrust of the WTO as an 
institution. They have lost faith in the WTO system because 
developed countries have failed to deliver on their promises. Best 
endeavour clauses in many of the agreements have been ignored 
and provisions of Special and Differential Treatment for developing 
countries have been inadequate to protect their interests in the 
multilateral trading system. The importance of the institution 
rather than the substance of the policy is reflected in the fact that 
most developing countries supported making the UN Set4 binding. 
4 the United Nations Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business 
Practices. 
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After the imposition of TRIPs, which 
has been very harmful to their 
interests, developing countries are 
particularly reluctant to enter into 
negotiations on new issues lihe 
competition about which they have 
little knowledge or experience. 
After the imposition of TRIPs, which has been very harmful to 
their interests, developing countries are particularly reluctant to 
enter into negotiations on new issues like competition about which 
they have little knowledge or experience. Developing countries do 
not yet understand all the issues that are at stake and should not 
negotiate until they do so. There is a clear need for more research 
and studies to be carried out so that developing countries can 
improve their understanding of competition issues in their 
economies. 
Developing countries have very limited capacity in their trade- 
negotiating teams and do not have the resources to take on the 
broad agenda proposed by the EU and others. As Philippe Brusick 
of UNCTAD also opined that developing countries should identify 
their by interests very soon to prepare themselves for negotiations. 
Many feel that the WTO's agenda was already overloaded before 
the introduction of competition, investment, trade facilitation and 
government procurement to the Agenda after the Doha Ministerial. 
There are also concerns that the structure of the WTO system 
would make it inappropriate for competition policy. 
Developing countries need to form a clear idea of what provisions 
would maximise the benefits and minimise the risks of an MCP to 
them. Some development-focused provisions are given in the box 
below and are intended to stimulate further discussion on this 
important topic. 
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5 There are currently a number of training programmes being funded by donors and international organisations such as 
the World Bank, DFID, IDRC, UNCTAD, OECD, EU, USAID, AUSAID, etc., to inform policy-makers about the issues 
involved, to raise awareness in civil society and to train officials in the necessary disciplines to implement CL. While 
these training programmes are addressing an urgent need, there is very little co-ordination between donors and there is 
a danger of overlap in some areas and gaps in others. It may also be difficult for a developing country to identify the 
most appropriate training programmes from the plethora of those available. This situation needs to be tackled by 
donor agencies in co-operation with one another. 
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MCP provisions with a development dimension 
No obligator), implementation of nationctl CL: In many countries, policy-makers and civil society are 
only just starting to become aware of competition issues. They do not yet have a clear idea of how 
their national competition challenges may best be met. While there are strong reasons for implementing 
national CL, some countries may prefer to take a regional approach or may not at present have the 
resources to devote to the effective implementation of CL. The national legislature may have other 
priorities central to the country's development strategy. For all of these reasons, the MCP should 
not require that developing countries implement a national CL. 
No harmonisation of CL provisions: There is no 'one size fits all' in CL. Countries will have different 
needs depending on their size, economic, political and social characteristics and development strategies. 
CL should be designed carefully to meet these needs. 
No restrictions on the provisions of national CL: To fit in vvith the national development strategy, 
countries may wish to include certain exceptions and exemptions into their laws. Other countries may 
have an interest in the withdrawal of these provisions for market access reasons and, hence, may 
try to exert pressure on them through the WTO forum. The MCP should not contain any restrictions 
on national legal provisions and national CL provisions should not be part of the WTO bargaining. 
Appropriate dispute settlement mechanism (DSM): The DSM should consider disputes on transparency, 
fairness and adherence to core competition principles in national laws only and should not stretch 
beyond. The body would also need to have the capacity to engage in its own investigations. 
Provisions for technical assistance: In order to get to the stage where all developing country and least 
developed country WTO members can make use of an MCP, these countries need to build their own 
capacity. Very few of these countries have much knowledge of and experience in competition issues 
and they need to build up their skills and know-how. There will, therefore, be a need for ongoing 
technical assistance, including general and target,ed training programmes5. 
Information sharing without strict reciprocity: Developing country CA will only benefit from an MCP 
if it improves their access to information from the authorities of developed countries. To facilitate 
the same, a mandatory system of exchange of infonnation may be developed by putting forward all 
the enquiries made in the CA, whether dealt with or not. However, information sharing in the 
opposite direction could be a burden and divert resources away from more urgent uses. 
Positive comity without strict reciprocity: Positive comity requires an authority to consider the requests 
of another national authority under it,s own laws. This could be very useful for developing countries. 
Distribution of fines: The MCP should contain a mechanism for the distribution of fines for cartels 
and other anti-competitive practices across all the affected countries. 
Chapter-VIII 
Recommendations 
For Developing Countries 
Enact a competition law; 
Put consumer welfare at the heart of the law; 
Include provisions relating to the international dimension; 
Ensure adequate resources are available for implementation; 
Create a strong independent authority; 
Give the new authority political support at the highest level; 
Enact a consumer law; 
Ensure that there is a clear demarcation of roles between 
different government bodies; 
Ensure consistency between policies and laws; and 
Explore international co-operation. 
For Consumer Organisations 
Be a nuisance to the government, the CA and companies; 
Carry out preliminary investigations and be a catalyst for action; 
Reach out to the public with examples they can understand; 
Create awareness through the media of the need for a 
competitive economic environment that includes traditionally 
protected sectors; 
Consider the international dimension. With an increasing 
number of consumer products (services as well as goods) being 
provided across borders or by multinational companies, consumer 
groups cannot afford to maintain this narrow perspective; and 
Explore international co-operation with other consumer 
organisations and NG0s. 
For Developing Country CAs 
Use national law where possible for international competition 
abuses; 
Seek out all sources of information, including whatever is publicly 
available; 
Seek informal or formal co-operation agreements, where possible; 
Ensure that the CA is able to keep information confidential; 
Pursue regional arrangements, where possible; and 
Explore international co-operation. 
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For the International Community 
Conduct research and studies to investigate developing countries' 
competition needs and the likely impact of an MCP on developing 
countries; 
Providing training and financial assistance to the developing 
countries; 
Consider whether the WTO is the most appropriate place for an 
MCP and if other options, such as UNCTAD or a free-standing 
World Competition Forum, could meet global needs better; and 
Explore international cooperation. 
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Competition - Varying Perceptions 
What is 'competition'? 
How does it fit culturally? 
Has 'competition' got a bad name? 
Has the International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank (WB) 
push undermined the cause? 
Should we stop talking about competition policy and focus on 
anti-monopoly, anti-trust, anti-cartel, fair trade and monopoly 
regulation? 
Does the language used also reflect interests? 
It was clear from the discussion among the assembled group that 
the term 'competition' carried mixed meanings. We were reminded 
that when the term was first translated into Japanese, the term 
became 'fighting with each other to succeed'. This meaning was 
immediately greeted with a belief that actually you succeeded by 
co-operating. In this light, competition never really fitted into the 
cultural milieu of turn-of-the-century Japan. At the symposium, it 
was notable that the East Asian and African delegates, in particular, 
tended to view competition policy with great suspicion. 
A good deal of confusion occurred when trying to dissect the 
relationship between economic competition and competition policy. 
In this light, the term 'competition' tended to have become 
associated with liberalisation and deregulation and, in turn, that 
these terms had become sullied by the 'false liberalisation' that 
had blighted many developing countries. These false liberalisations 
occurred when public monopolies were privatised into private 
monopolies, without the relevant regulatory structures being put 
into place. 
With the confusion of terms and sullying of the policy by poor WB/ 
IMF design, it was suggested that we might bypass some of the 
problem by using different language to discuss the problem. In this 
light, it was notable that many competition agencies in developing 
countries and the laws that they administer were called anti- 
monopoly authorities, fair trading organisations and the like. 
Similarly, many laws were anti-monopoly laws and fair trading 
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An analogy was used to illustrate the 
fact that we needed to think of 
competition policy as part of the 
regulatory toolkik it was vety good at 
some things, but coukl not deliver on 
every social goal. 
laws. This was unlikely to be a coincidence and the experience 
indicated just how important language was in the discussion of 
policy options. 
What and how the Toolkit should be? 
Nuts and bolts need spanners not screwdrivers; 
Different nuts need different spanners size and shape; 
The relationship between competition policy and other related 
policies: Consumer policy, corruption, trade and regulation; 
What competition policy is and what it is not? 
Another confusion in the discussion centred on what competition 
policy and law could do and what they could not. The analogy of a 
toolkit was brought into play. It was pointed out that when 
assembling a cabinet (one of those flat packed 'do-it-yourself ones 
which is assembled with various sizes of nuts and bolts, which 
come along with the DIY kit) one uses a spanner. Depending on 
the size of the nuts and bolts to assemble the cabinet, one uses 
different sized spanners. One will not use a screwdriver because 
there are no screws to be put in. Furthermore, if there are screws 
involved, one may use an electric screwdriver, which will be more 
efficient than a manual one. But one cannot use a screwdriver to 
tighten nuts! 
The analou was used to illustrate the fact that we needed to think 
of competition policy as part of the regulatory toolkit; it was very 
good at some things, but could not deliver on every social goal. Like 
the market, competition policy was good at delivering on greater 
efficiency, but was lousy at other things most notably the 
distribution of benefits within society. We needed to be clear that 
we were using competition policy for the right job and that we were 
neither seeking to use it to solve all our problems nor seeking to 
blame it for problems that had nothing to do with it. 
In this regard, it was important to look at the interface of 
competition policy with other closely related parts of the regulatory 
toolkit. Here it was important to see the relationship between 
competition policy and three major related policy areas: consumer 
protection, trade policy and anti-corruption policies. A Venn Diagram 
was exhibited to the symposium that tried to map the relationships 
and the important areas of overlap. 
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As was clear from the meeting, the relationship between competition 
and consumer policies was, perhaps, the most important one. 
Consumer policy covered a much broader canvas of approaches and 
tools than competition policy did, and it was the key to see 
competition in this regard. 
The relationship between trade and competition policy was seen as 
primarily being one of ensuring that the benefits of trade 
liberalisation were passed on to consumers through effectively 
operating markets, rather than allowing them to be captured by 
anti-competitive behaviour or agreements. The difficult area of bid- 
rigging sat between anti-corruption policies and competition laws. 
It was clear from some of the discussions around the 7-Up project2 
that different regimes dealt with bid rigging in different ways. For 
some it was part of a criminal anti-corruption regime, for others 
part of a competition regime. What was important was not so much 
that different regimes dealt with the issue differently, but that the 
policy was seen to sit in the overlap between the two, capable of 
being dealt with by either. 
In some ways, the most important of the policy relationships was 
between competition policy and sectoral regulation (generally 
utilities, such as telecom, electricity, water etc). Competition policy 
was not directly equated with a liberalisation and privatisation 
policy, as discussed before. The role of sectoral regulation as a 
proxy for competition policy was the key, and the transition and 
relationship between the two was important. 
Competition Concerns in Small Economies 
Are the problems different? 
Do they have cartels, abuse of dominance or in a different 
way? 
Are the solutions different? 
Stripped down policies and bodies? 
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A number of potential differences in 
drafting and enforcement mechcatisms 
were discussed in the meeting. 
A good deal was made during the discussions and presentations of 
the problems of small economies in dealing with anti-competitive 
practices. The problem was not just that small economies suffered 
abuse at the hands of very large trans-national corporations, but 
that their economies tended to be dominated by large domestic 
incumbents. However, it was not at all clear from the discussion 
whether the problems of small economies were necessarily different 
from those of larger economies, or whether they were just 
exaggerated. Similarly, if the problems were essentially the same, 
but larger, it was not clear whether the solutions were necessarily 
different. 
A number of potential differences in drafting and enforcement 
mechanisms were discussed in the meeting. The example of Bhutan 
(see pg-6) appeared useful in this regard. The use of more general 
communal pressure and publicity in very small communities was 
also voiced as very useful in curbing unfair practices. 
There was also an important issue of enforcement resources and 
whet,her a stripped down version of competition policy was preferable 
to a full-blown law, if enforcement resources were limited. Perhaps 
the key issue to resolve in this regard was whether the competition 
problems (both in terms of abuses and solutions) were diverging 
from or converging on the experiences of other economies. Once 
this issue was resolved, it would be clearer whether smaller 
economies needed to adopt policies similar to advanced economies 
in anticipation of converged problems and solutions, or search for 
an alternative model. 
Administration and People 
Leadership: Hegel's revenge great people are needed to change 
things 
Importance of keeping focus on consumers 
There was a good deal of debate about whether it was important 
to have good laws in place, or to have the right sort of people in 
charge of competition agencies. What became dear in the discussion 
was that what was needed was actually a combination of good 
drafting and effective leadership. It was impossible to get away 
from the fact that leadership really did matter - this was the 
argument about Hegel's revenge. 
The Hegelian theory of history argued that history was advanced 
only through the actions of great men (always men at that time!) 
rather than broader social forces. To some extent, it had to be 
recognised that competition law and policy was best advanced 
through the efforts of 'great' people - i.e., the leaders of competition 
agencies. However, such leadership was not much use if the laws 
and institutions were not in place to deliver real benefits to 
consumers. 
32 Challenges in Implementing a Competition Policy and Law ct)d.s0 A CUTS 
The Trends and Challenges 
More liberal environment; 
Lower barriers, greater capital mobility and greater integration 
both internationally and regionally; 
Dominance through FDI; 
Incumbent anti-competitive reaction; 
International effect; 
Exposure of existing cartels; 
Creation of new cartels; and 
Wider effect of mergers. 
One of the key discussions that ran through each session was 
focused on the key trends pulsing through the world economy. The 
list of key policies included the more liberal envirmunent generally 
operating in the world economy; both in terms of more liberal 
policies and in a more liberal approach to the philosophy of 
regulation. These more liberal policies included, generally, lower 
barriers to trade and market entry and a trend towards greater 
integration of economies. A question arose over whether this more 
liberal approach would create new competition problems by creating 
dominance through foreign direct investment; or whether it would 
create new problems simply by bringing in a more effective abuser 
of monopoly power! Against this had to be balanced the issue of 
incumbent response. 
We heard from a number of participants about the ability of 
incumbent firms to react to potential or real new entry through 
blockading tactics. The tendency of lower barriers to increase the 
cross-border impact of mergers and anti-competitive agreements 
and activities was also noticed. A further trend of note related to 
cartels. It was noted that cartels appeared to be increasingly likely 
to be exposed by investigating agencies. However, it was not clear 
if the liberalisation process was actually increasing the number of 
cartels and facilitating their exposure, or simply making them 
easier to find. 
Lastly, the wider effects of mergers was also raised in the 
discussions, and how developing countries may find it difficult to 
cope with them. 
The International Dimension 
Are there competition issues of an international nature (mergers, 
abuse of dominance, cartels, and market division)? 
Are there trade dimensions specific to them? 
Do they harm developing countries in particular? 
The impact of the international aspect of competition policy was 
both a specific discussion and a constant theme throughout the 
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Due to a lack of enforcement at the 
national level in many developing 
countries, it was not always clear that 
the country was particularly 
disadvantaged 
meeting. The key questions seemed to boil down to the need to 
identify specifically international dimensions to competition problems, 
whether there were trade elements to them and whether developing 
countries were harmed in any particular way as a result. The 
discussion seemed to point to the affirmative in all the areas. 
There was clearly a specifically international dimension to the 
competition 'problem'. The operation of cross-border cartels was the 
most obvious and egregious example of this. The trade dimension 
was clear once you viewed the problem from the international 
dimension 'down', as it were. 
The position of developing countries in relation to international 
competition problems was a key topic of debate. Due to a lack of 
enforcement at the national level in many developing countries, it 
was not always clear that the country was particularly 
disadvantaged. The view that developing countries were 
disadvantaged came particularly from a combination of the limited 
cartel evidence that existed and the view deduced from the evidence 
in cartel cases, that cartels and abusive practices were most likely 
to be targeted at countries where the market was most important 
and where the enforcement ability of the country was weakest. 
What are the Solutions? 
Domestic right size of the nuts and the spanners; 
Bilateral can be good but unbalanced; 
Regional good track record in Europe; 
Multilateral great promise but many hurdles; and 
The Pirandello problem: Six authors in search of a story six 
problems in search of a solution. 
The participants pointed to a number of possible solutions to the 
'problems' faced by countries dealing with anti-competitive practices. 
What became dear was that the approach that was needed involved 
dealing with the right problems at the right level. The difficulty 
here was identifying the fit between levels and policies. 
For all economies, but particularly for smaller economies, one of 
the key questions related to the size of the problem being dealt 
with and the tools available to the country. The problem was not 
open to a standard solution and there were no 'off the peg' answers 
that could be applied. The solution could only come with a rather 
pragmatic assessment by the country concerned about the best 
way forward. This depended a lot on the ability of the country to 
pursue the policy agenda and the likelihood that a regional solution 
may also be available. 
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The proposals put forward in the WTO 
Conunittee on Trade and Competition 
Policy had promise - but progress was 
twt guaranteed 
While it was clearly important for 
consumer organisations to focus on 
what they needed to do to promote the 
interests of their constituency, it was 
also important to focus on what 
governments needed to do. 
On the sort of solutions available for countries, there appeared to 
be three key approaches for co-operation. The bilateral route was 
probably the easiest in terms of negotiation. However, power 
imbalances between parties and the likelihood that a big developed 
country would respond in a timely fashion to co-operation requests 
from a number of developing countries had to be taken into account. 
The regional route had a good track record in Europe. However, 
the example of Europe was viewed as being fairly unique, and its 
applicability to developing countries was questionable at the very 
least. The regional approach was thus best tailored to the reality 
of developing country co-operation, rather than tested against the 
European experience. 
The multilateral approach was viewed as potentially offering great 
promise. However, while the potential pay-off was high, it was not 
clear how successful the process might be. The proposals put forward 
in the wrro Committee on Trade and Competition Policy had promise 
but progress was not guaranteed. 
The fundamental problem for all policy-makers boiled down to what 
was termed the Tirandello Problem'. Pirandello wrote a play called 
'six characters in search of an author' and much of the international 
competition 'problem' seemed to centre on six problems (such as 
cartels et al) in search of a solution. 
What Countries need to do? 
Enact a competition law; 
Make the consumer their focus; 
Incorporate consumer bodies within the governing board of the 
agency; and 
Enable consumer representatives to sue firms engaged in anti- 
competitive acts. 
While it was clearly important for consumer organisations to focus 
on what they needed to do to promote the interests of their 
constituency, it was also important to focus on what governments 
needed to do. This would provide an agenda for change for consumer 
organisations to focus on. 
Firstly a country clearly had to implement a competition law and/ 
or policy. This was a pre-requisite for dealing with many of the 
problems being faced. Secondly, the focus of the law and the 
institution needed to be the consumer. It was clear that the public 
acceptance of competition policy was central to its success and the 
role of the consumer movement was important here. Incorporating 
consumer organisations into the governance structures of the 
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While the consumer movement is firmly 
rooted in its community, it needs to 
raise its eyes from the local and deal 
with the global, when necesscuy. 
competition agencies and enabling them to take private actions 
against those engaged in anti-consumer practices was also important. 
What can Consumer Organisations do? 
Be a nuisance to firms, to regulators and to governments; 
Be an advocate at all levels; 
Make it real to consumers; 
Focus on what matters to them; 
Operate at all levels; and 
Don't be parochial when an international view is needed and 
vice versa! 
As many of the participants in the debate were consumer 
organisations, we needed to think about what it was that they 
could do. It was simply not enough for consumer organisations to 
cede all responsibility for dealing with the problems to regulators 
and governments. Given the impact of anti-competitive behaviour 
on consumers, there was a clear responsibility for consumer 
organisations to get their act together. The key roles for consumer 
organisations include being a nuisance and raising the issues before 
the public, politicians and regulators. There is also a need to push 
competition issues and be an advocate for competition laws and 
policies. This must be done at all levels, national, regional and 
international. 
One of the most important jobs centred on making the issues in 
competition investigations and discussions real to consumers. 
Consumer organisations should not continue to operate as some 
form of priesthood that discussed these issues solely among 
themselves to the exclusion of the public. One of the main attitudes 
that needed to be addressed was that consumer organisations had 
to ensure that they did not focus entirely on the national, when the 
international view was more appropriate and vice versa. While the 
consumer movement is firmly rooted in its community, it needs to 




The 'problem' of small economies; 
Administration and people; 
The trends and challenges; 
The solutions; and 
The role of consumer organisations. 
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It is important to be careful about the 
language that is used - there was no 
universal acceptance outside of the 
competition community about the 
conwwn language used to describe 
competition problems. 
It was important to have good, sound 
rules, but it was also clear that 
having the right people to implement 
those rules was important 
In conclusion, the debate in the conference appeared to boil down 
to the following important points: 
It is important to be careful about the language that is used 
there was no universal acceptance outside of the competition 
community about the common language used to describe competition 
problems. Indeed, the language used to convey ideas may cause 
more problems than the ideas themselves. This was particularly 
clear in the discussions of the East Asian experience. 
The tools available to competition regulators and consumer 
organisations needed addressing. This was not a check-box operation 
but was central to the ability of regulators and consumer 
organisations in doing their jobs. 
It was clear from the conference that smaller economies faced 
particular problems. However, it was not clear whether the problems 
were actually different, or whether they were simply of a different 
scale. This distinction was important, if applicable solutions were 
to be developed for those economies. 
It was also clear from the discussion that the right people and the 
right laws were not an either/or choice. It was important to have 
good, sound rules, but it was also clear that having the right people 
to implement those rules was important. It would not work if there 
are good laws but no good people to implement, and vice versa. 
The background to the discussion about competition and trade policy 
presented a particular challenge. There were specific economic and 
political trends surging through the world economy and these had 
to be both recognised and dealt with in the process of formulating 
competition policies. The lowering of barriers and opening up of 
markets presented a boost to transparency in economies as well as 
ever-more routes to abuse for firms engaged in, for example, cartels. 
The direction of the world economy was important to take into 
account when drafting the most appropriate rules for the game. 
The discussion centred on the need for flexibility in the marmer in 
which these problems were dealt with. There was no 'off the peg' 
solution available and the application of one would be 
counterproductive. Imagination and fledbility were the key terms 
in moving the agenda forward. 
There appeared to be no doubt that an international dimension was 
present in competition policy problems. However, there was 
considerably less agreement on the right way forward or the right 
forum for dealing with the issues raised. However, a good deal of 
the debate seemed to centre on a suspicion of motives and general 
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attitude toward institutions rather than a specific opposition to the 
idea of discussions and/or negotiations. 
Finally, it became clear that consumer organisations had an 
important role in taking forward the agenda on competition policy. 
Consumers were the obvious natural allies for competition officials 
and policies. This needed to be both recognised and built upon. A 
major part of this job involved consumer organisations making 
competition policy more of a priority area. 
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I. Monographs on Investment and 
Competition Policy 
Role of Competition Policy in Economic 
Development and The Indian Experience 
Competition and efficiency are the guiding 
principles of the liberal economic order. Any 
healthy competition must have rules that the 
players should follow. This is more so when the 
players are business organisations and their 
activities will have a larger impact on the society. 
This monograph examines the role of an effective 
competition policy in economic development from 
the Indian perspective. (32pp #9908 Rs.15/$5) 
FDI, mega-mergers and strategic alliances: 
is global competition accelerating 
development or heading towards world 
monopolies? 
Foreign Direct Investment, mergers, amalgamations 
and strategic alliances are the rules of the present 
day global economy. However, the crucial question 
is whether the movement of capital leads to further 
development and welfare of the society or the 
growth of monopolies. The monograph sheds light 
on the main contours of the global competion and 
its implication for the consumers. 
(24pp #9909 Rs. 15/$5) 
Competition Regimes Around the World 
In this paper, an attempt has been made to 
comply briefly, the current state of Competition 
Law in some select countries, on which 
information is readily available. The paper steers 
clear of any value judgements on the design and 
implementation of the Competition Law in the 
countries covered herein. 
(40pp #2002, Rs.20/$5). 
Globalisation, Competition Policy and 
International Trade Negotiations 
This paper maps out the issues concerning 
multilateral competition policy, from southern 
perspective. It concludes that there is a need for 
a realistic assessment of the Extent to which 
developing countries would be able to control 
MNCs under the disciplines of competition law. 
(38pp #2003, Rs.20/$5). 
Annexure-I 
CUTS' PUBLICATIONS 
Trade, Competition & Multilateral 
Competition Policy 
As the title suggests, this monograph clarifies the 
areas of interaction between trade and 
competition through case studies, and shows that 
such interactions are on rise. It also highlights 
efforts being taken for a multilateral competition 
policy after Second World War in form of 
Havana Charter till the present happenings at the 
World Trade Organisation. It further points out 
the provisions in various agreements of the WTO 
acquis, which have the elements of competition. 
Most importantly, the paper brings forward the 
debate vis-à-vis multilateral competition policy 
that is currently taking place at various fora. It 
analytically points out the hindrances in such a 
policy and highlights the need for a multilateral 
competition policy. (36p #0005, Rs.20/$5). 
All About Competition Policy & Law 
This monograph meant for advance learner, deals 
with various elements of competition law and 
policy in comprehensive manner. It describes 
about various restrictive business practices 
(RBPs) at the market place. It further clarifies 
what are competition law and policy, their 
elements and how they can be used to curb 
various kinds of RBPs. It further draws out 
interface of competition policy with economic 
development, poor and foreign investment. Finally 
it describes the genesis of competition law/policy 
and in which direction it is moving. 
(70pp #0006, Rs.20/$5). 
All About International Investment 
Agreements 
This briefing kit for the general reader provides 
an overview of recent trends in the proliferating 
number of bilateral and regional investment 
agreements. The kit highlights the key issues in 
these agreements and considers past initiatives 
and prospects at the multilateral level. (64pp 
#0102, Rs.20/$5) 
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Competition Policy & Law Made Easy 
This publication meant for the activists, aims at 
generating minimum amount of awareness on 
competition law and policy. It could be helpful 
for a common person to identify anti-competitive 
practices in the market place and take action to 
rectify the same. (36pp. #0109, Rs.20/$5) 
Making Investment Work for Developing 
Countries 
This monograph, intended for everyone interested 
in investment issues, looks at the impact of 
Foreign Direct Investment in developing 
countries, pointing out both beneficial and harmful 
aspects. The study also looks in detail at the kind 
of policies that governments can adopt in order 
to maximise the benefits from FDI, covering the 
institutional set-up as well as targeted investment 
policies. (44pp. #0110, Rs.20/$5) 
II. Event Reports 
Liberalised Trade & Fair Competition 
A report of the IOCU-CUTS International 
Conference on Competition Policy in the Context of 
Liberalisation, New Delhi, 20-21, January, 1995 
containing 19 papers from eminent competition 
practitioners and economists from all over the world. 
The recommendations include calling upon the WTO 
and UNCTAD to develop work programme on trade 
and competition and governments to involve public 
interests groups in policy making. A good 
documentation for anyone interested in trade and 
competition issues. (144pp #9501 Rs.100/US$25) 
The UN Code of Conduct for TNCs: Why it 
collapsed...The Way Ahead 
Evidence submitted at the Permanent Peoples' 
Tribunal, London, November, 1994. Contains a 
statement with supporting enclosures which include 
several original documents. An extremely good 
resource material for anyone interested in the issues 
of regulation of global business. 
(#9401 Rs. 30/US$ 15) 
Por more details, visit our website at www.cuts.org. 
Investments: Consumers, Development and 
the Environment 
A report of the CI-CUTS International Seminar on 
Multilateral Frameworks for Investment, Geneva 18- 
19 October, 1996. The report contains 10 papers from 
eminent experts of different viewpoints. The report 
covers issues concerning investment liberalisation and 
its impact on consumer, development and environment. 
A must reading for those following international 
investment agreements. (93pp #9602 Rs. 501US$ 15) 
IIL Discussion Paper 
Multilateralisation of Sovereignty: Proposals 
for multilateral frameworks for investment 
The paper written by Pradeep S Mehta and Raghav 
Narsalay analyses the past, present and future of 
investment liberalisation and regulation. It also 




Analyses of the Interaction between Trade 
and Competition Policy 
This not only provides information about the views of 
different countries on various issues being discussed 
at the working group on competition, but also informs 
them about the views of experts on competition 
concerns being discussed on the WTO platform and 
the possible direction these discussions would take 
place in near future. It also contains an analyses on 
the country's presentations by CUTS. ($25/Rs.100) 
ISBN 81-87222-33-6 
V Briefing Papers 
Competition Policy In A Globalising And 
Liberalising World Economy 
Competition Regime in India: What is Required? 
Globalisation: Enhancing Competition or 
Creating Monopolies? 
Trade, Competition & Multilateral Competition 
Policy 
Contours of A National Competition Policy: A 
Development perspective 
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Survey Results* 
Do you think that competition policy and law at the national level are 
important for consumer welfare? 
Did your views on this change in any manner as a result of the 
Symposium? 
Do you think that it is necessary for developing countries to have a 
national competition law? 
Do you think that it is necessary for developing countries to have a 
national consumer protection law? 
Do yo think that a multilateral competition policy would help small 
countries and their consumers? 
Annexure-II 
* Based on the responses of the participants of the symposium, "Competition Policy and Consumer Interest in the Global 
Economy" on 12-13 October 2001, Geneva. 
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Necessary Needed with pre-conditions 
96% 4% 
Fully Reinforced Partially Not at all 
24% 44% la 20% 
Necessary Needed with pre conditions Not needed 
09/0 36% 470 
Necessary Needed with pre conditions Not needed 
10% 4% 
Yes Not Sure No 
20% 20% 
Do you think that developing countries should support an MCP at WTO? 
Did your views on MCP change as a result of the symposium? 
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Yes Not Sure No 
WM 16670 
Yes Reinforced No Already in 
favour of MCP 
24% 24% 28% 24% 
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